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W I L L I A M  A N S E L M I  &  L I S E  H O G A N  
 
I .  T H E  E U R O P E  W E  H A V E  A L W A Y S  K N O W N  
 
Two recent Chechen-Russian wars have taken a disastrous toll on the In 
order to contextualize this work, the specifics of the discourse 
undertaken must be presented. The point of view offered with regards to 
the formation of the European Union as a dynamic process is from a 
humanistic perspective. What will color the analysis is the concept of 
ethics, and this will be placed within the cultural structure of the EU as 
an ongoing, multicultural reality. In doing so we would also like to posit 
what the notions of agora and Heimat might suggest in terms of the 
problematic that arises with regards to the vision of the European Union. 
Briefly, then, in positioning agora as any communicative and 
informative space (concrete or virtual) where citizens meet to discuss the 
politics of everyday life, and by recuperating the term Heimat as that 
indicating the bounding relationship between people of the same family, 
of the same group, we intend to use the terms to show the tension that is 
at stake for the various forces shaping the EU while trying to arrive at a 
common platform. 
Yet, after the preliminary framing of our discourse, the concrete 
reality of the European Union must be brought to the fore in so far as 
recent events have shaped that reality. After France and Holland’s 
refusal of the new European constitution in the late spring of 2005, the 
economic vision of an integrated Europe has defaulted. At stake was 
more than how to manage economically a 25-state model. What the 
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responses to the various referenda have shown is evidently a lack on the 
part of the three European bodies (Parliament, Commission and Council) 
to address a cultural policy as an integrative model. Originally, the plan 
of a united Europe was, first and foremost, to avoid other bloodbaths as 
envisioned by the likes of Altiero Spinelli, and the development that has 
taken place has been quite successful on that front. However, the 
integrating dynamic has been left mainly to the economic process, and as 
such, it has been called into question by the negative referenda responses. 
Perhaps, though late at this stage of the process, what must be addressed 
is the cultural area where questions of identity are crisscrossed by 
reality-shaping technologies and processes of globalization. A possible 
starting point, for us, is the question of ethics as a framing mechanism for 
the European Union. 
If we can agree that ethics, as a conceptual framework, means a set of 
shared values on the part of the citizens as individuals of the EU, the first 
problem is to define precisely what constitutes this set of shared values. 
Ethics, in its construction, has been formed by extrapolating and 
applying values from a common culture sustained by a common 
language. The traditional relationship between culture and language is 
one that is inextricably tied to an historical formation of a particular 
anthropological space as a lived reality. Europe as a geo-political entity 
has formulated its history on a common ethic based on a language, 
Latin, and on the “tolerance” of one religious culture, Christianity, that 
still lingers in the complex definition of what it means today to be 
European. By stating this, what is being addressed is not an indication 
of what could be interpreted to be the recuperation of a tradition. What is 
being discussed is the genealogy of a “European” formation and the 
necessary notion that it is only by being aware of historical trajectories 
that the future might be less a hazard and more an encompassing and 
elastic social framework. In the past, for a specific period, what came to 
be Europe sustained the inclusion of Heimat within the more generalized 
space of an extended agora, given the precise borders of a constitutive 
religious and political culture. Of course, such a process was constituted 
by the specific dynamics of inclusion/exclusion of the designated Other 
(women, members of other faiths, invaders, etc) by part of the power 
structures of the period. 
The necessity of addressing at the start the sense of history that 
permeates European reality is made even more pressing by the fact that a 
general sense of history, in our present condition in the Western world, is 
being undermined if not necessarily subtracted from the experience of 
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everyday life by political and economic forces, the result of which is to 
erase history from the individual’s experience of life. This is so since 
living in an ‘eternal present’ is conducive to a system that necessitates 
social control as a modus vivendi. An individual, a subject, a citizen 
whose sense of history is negated is an easily manipulated being, a dupe 
waiting to be empowered by entertainment. That is, if we can refer to 
popular culture with the Beatles, we are all content being part of a 
process, which is supposed to make of us “fools on a hill.” Yet, such a 
cultural reference from the English pop world of the sixties is not 
gratuitous since it serves the simple purpose of indicating, once again, the 
general problem faced in the construction of Europe. Given that Latin 
and Christianity are not references which are chartered as obligatory 
values in the European constitution, what language and therefore what 
culture is to be the foundation for a European ethics? Can more than one 
co-exist and still give form to a shared ethics? By our reference to the 
Beatles, we have by sleight of hand introduced at the periphery of the 
discourse the question of technology and of the multimediatic space we 
all have come to inhabit in the present world. It is quite obvious to 
anyone who deals in the process of communication/information, for 
example, that the predominant form of communication and information 
is the English language and that the World Wide Web is shaped by it; 
downloading the song “The Fool on the Hill,” one is instantaneously 
part of a specific community. 
A philosophy of ethics has evolved over the course of the centuries in 
many ways. One could go from grounding the discourse in a closed, 
social Aristotelian reality to one based on a religious enclosure of the 
medieval period, to one based on an economic discourse as was the case 
for Adam Smith and Marx, to the present fragmentation of the subject 
given the various paradigm shifts – finally, models of conduct – that 
have occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Generally, then, one can talk about ethics as an historical process that 
develops and is transformed by the evolution of societal contexts. 
Parallel to this, undoubtedly, is the discourse of progress, which is a 
general attribute of modernity and one that, epistemologically, still 
informs us. Ethics, as we have already stated, needed a shared culture, a 
shared language, not only a shared sense of history and/or development. 
The question, then, is simply this: is it possible to frame the EU 
around a multicultural ethics? That is, can a set of visibly behavioural 
values, how one acts in society (by saying this we are being reductive on 
purpose, in a Wittgensteinian sense), emerge from different languages 
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and cultures, from a multicultural and multilingual space as the EU is 
now? In addition, subsequently, will the process inevitably lead, once 
again, to a dominant language and to a dominant culture, as has been the 
case?  
The Western world, as it has come to define itself, is at present under 
the strain of a dominant economic and cultural discourse that 
inescapably engages the rest of the world. Such a process has been given 
many names from Empire to Manifest Destiny, all of which seem to treat 
the process as an independent state of affairs, and not as a direct 
consequence of European expansionism. It is impossible to escape from 
such considerations the moment one is part of the information process, of 
the multimediatic circuit that shapes our lifeworld. The war in Iraq as a 
fallout also produced a tension that still resonates within the EU, 
splitting and polarizing various members along the way. Not only has 
this occurred along political and economical lines, but also, and most 
importantly for us, along cultural lines. Certain cultural operators have 
talked about a great philosophical divide occurring between Europe and 
the USA, one Kantian and the other Hobbesian. Although it is not our 
intention to explore here at great length this divide, we contend that it is 
a false dialectic since polarization always brings into play absolutes 
that resist any type of synthesis. Yet, the vision of a world based on the 
struggle between nature and society (Hobbes) against one based on the 
problem between ethics and history (Kant) must be considered since it 
assumes in its discourse an epistemological construct stuck in time, with 
all the contradictions that permeate such a position. Along these lines 
then, a dominant economic, cultural and linguistic paradigm is already 
at work in the world, shaping – as it manifests itself – the limits of any 
other economic, cultural and linguistic model-in-the-making as is the 
case for the EU. Given such a forceful constraint, the aspect of 
multilingual and multicultural nation-states (we are purposely 
pluralizing the second part of this conceptual framework) must, by 
necessity, become a utopic discourse based on historical development. 
What is shared, and still materially and visibly so, in the EU is a 
common culture based on a humanistic narrative. In the end, if we are to 
listen to Milan Kundera in his latest book Le rideau (The Curtain), Europe 
became Europe because its art became its history. That is, certain writers 
and artists, transcending the confines of national literatures, became the 
common wealth of a Europe-in-becoming. Therefore, in order to answer 
the question of the possibility of framing the EU around a multicultural 
ethics, one possible starting point for an answer is to trace the genealogy 
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of a European culture (which does not necessarily translate into forced 
Eurocentrism). In doing so, in the act of engaging oneself with a common, 
humanistic culture and its genealogy, one finds the possibility to ground 
each state into a federalist nation with an ethics, a shared set of values 
that emerge from a shared narrative. After all, if the act of reading has 
taught us anything, it is that a society comes together as a narrative of 
which ethics is the grammar. The developing process that is being 
presented is ground in history, but does not turn to stop and look back 
like some angel of history à la Benjamin, since it comes to encompass in 
its formative gaze the developing horizon. In such a fashion, the question 
of one language-one culture is extended by a culture with different, 
shared languages. Ethics is then formed as the Heimat that consolidates 
itself and extends itself through the common agora in a dynamic process. 
By having posited this, we realize that the position presented could 
be seen as weak, easily deconstructable in contrast to the dominant 
cultural paradigm of postmodernism. Postmodernism has quite 
successfully masked the ideological intent that governs it, by 
deconstructing History from a set of Great Stories (given as the 
ideological foundations that constituted Fascism, Nazism, Communism) 
to the individual stories of everyday life, without calling into question 
its own origins and its own locus of power. In other words, while 
destabilizing the precarious balance of modern thought, postmodernism 
has managed to hide its own ideological construct and the discourse of 
power associated to it. This manipulative discursive practice would 
have made Wittgenstein turn to Nietzsche’s hammer were it not that the 
philosophical escamotage operated within postmodernism should be 
seen as the extent to which the multimediatic world operates. After all, 
isn’t the web a beautiful arena of many extraordinarily different, small 
stories all interlocking in a hyper-anarchic process, a case where the 
agora and Heimat merge one into the other, and cancel each other out in 
re-creating the free world of Francis Fukuyama’s fame? 
The ironic allusion we have made to techné as not just another 
problem in the formation of a common ethics for the EU is now becoming 
increasingly evident since it permeates the lifeworld as a constitutive 
and manipulative element. The immediate danger is the 
dematerialization of the experience of life, since the application of 
technology, as it expands into every detail of our individual lives, filters 
out the agora and inescapably reduces the grounds of Heimat. 
Increasingly technology, which we still regard as the proved proof of 
progress, is associated with the way we communicate. The portable 
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phone is such an index: anyone who travels from A to B can catch the on-
going comedy of people on the street who gesticulate more or less – 
depending on the latitude –, and who are seemingly in a state of constant 
chatter with themselves. The translation for such a state of affairs is quite 
banal: the more we are connected, the less we interact. The famous 
European piazza has not been displaced by the super-sized malls of 
American fame, but is on its way to redundancy as our paths cross 
without notice, since we are always elsewhere within our system of 
communication. Such a small example, when entwined with such things 
as the web, being wired, surveillance, virtual reality, etc posits a 
radically different type of society. We suspect that even the common 
background we share is being altered imperceptibly but inevitably as we 
speak. Speed is the ultimate goal which can never be achieved; we’re 
already bored with ‘yesterday.’ The speed by which we move towards 
any possible futures undermines constantly the history of the formation 
of an ethics of the EU, as the genealogy which should re-constitute it is 
still ground in the written word while we are overtaken by the 
immaterial space of images. Such a process, techné coupled with speed, is 
directly tied to the present economic conditions: unbridled capitalism. 
The EU, when first born as the exchange market of basic material for the 
founding nations (steel and coal), used those economic ties as the 
grounding base upon which a united Europe would be formed. The 
utopic discourse resorted to the pragmatics of a common, constitutive 
language, the economy, as its framework. In a way, notwithstanding the 
process of an integration of intents from the economic to the cultural, the 
auspicated development and transformation has lagged and inevitably 
so. So that asking today about a grounding ethics for the EU is not just 
how to face a difficult challenge, but the necessary revisionism in the past 
of the present, if we can speak through this paradox. The difficulty of a 
multilingual, multicultural reality brought into a cohesive system is less 
of a problem than how to deal with the way individuals are being in-
formed by technology. The palpable, unmediated risk is to arrive at a 
culturally and linguistically unified agora, having as its inhabitants 
virtual beings whose Heimat could be on the dark side of the moon for 
all that matters. 
Such a risk, however, is at present being pushed aside by more 
concrete and political considerations that have little to do with a 
federalist Europe and more to do with its relevance and threat in world 
political agendas. After all, if we were to consider the latest fears of 
expansion of the EU, the role that Turkey plays in such a context is 
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seemingly without a real solution. Pushing it into a time frame of ten or 
so years is not really a solution but part of the problem. For, what is 
Turkey if not the destabilizing agent that can be used by the US/UK 
agenda to keep the EU underdeveloped as a (multi)cultural reality? 
Notwithstanding Cyprus’s concerns or various political moves, such as 
certain EU members making space for Slovenia in exchange for 
considering Turkey a candidate or appealing to a Christian sense of 
history, is it not the case that the process of inclusion has failed its 
prerogatives? After all, and we insist on this point, was it not the case 
that the EU was foreseen as an idealized reality and only then a cultural 
and economic community? Perhaps as the confusion is great under the 
sky of Europe, this is an excellent moment to reconsider the whole EU 
project. To re-group, basically. And to re-introduce a concept which 
might be quite useful right now. The concept of a two-speed Europe, the 
re-constitution of two areas of participation: one strictly economic, as the 
present structure would indicate, and the other, and we end with the 
other as a conceptual framework but, of course, constituted by that small 
number of states which, originally, had foreseen not just the economic but 
also the cultural integration as the constitutive procedure for an original 
experiment of social cohesion. 
 
I I .  A N  E C O N O M Y  O F  E U R O P E A N  I D E N T I T Y  –  F R O M  
T H E  T H E O R E T I C A L  T O W A R D S  T H E  P R A C T I C A L  V I A  
T H E  M E D I A  
Towards the Differentiation of Discursive Practice, The Case for ‘Reform’ 
Recent events seem to suggest that the EU experiment – since it is a work-
in-progress of sorts – has yet to culturally ground itself on a concrete 
structural framework. This is something we have alluded to, however 
ironically, in the first part of our work.  
This ‘constitutive fragility,’ which is both the strength and weakness 
inherent in the ‘becoming complex’ of the unification of varied 
histories/cultures (continuously re-integrated in terms of a ‘greater’ 
Europe), leaves the experiment open to a number of critical interventions, 
interventions characterized by a seemingly beneficial set of factors 
which are more in keeping with stalling the process, hijacking it or 
derailing it (the media reformist ideology) – as we shall try to prove –, 
than to filtering the contents of the process in order to make it sustainable 
as an ideal and a practice (the reformist ideology tout court). What is at 
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risk in the present world-system is the notion itself of cultural, social, 
and political systems capable of contrasting and offering livable 
alternatives to the world order we have come to inherit. 
Necessity dictates the need to come to terms with the use of the 
concept of ‘reform.’ Such a term has invariably assumed different 
connotative aspects throughout the course of the last few decades, 
especially if we take the symbolic time period of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall as a starting point. Reform is not only a potentially charged label 
but also a distinct – or, the way it has come into distinction – modus 
operandi: a process by which the Enlightenment’s notion of progress has 
had to be reformulated in terms of subtle semantic shifts that have come 
to include in its repertoire (of the term ‘reform’) contradictory political 
cognitive spaces, spaces that can entertain, with the blink of an eye, both 
the theory of ‘intelligent design’ and ‘stem cell research,’ for example.  
The reader will not fail to see in the use of such references and 
metaphors a propensity towards ‘cultural framing devices’ common to a 
dominating space of identity presently en vogue. Yet, such a bias cannot 
escape the zeitgeist, to use another term fallen in practical disuse given 
the velocity of, or instantaneous appearance of, culturally bounding 
newscasts (from podcasts, to blogs, to 24-hour TV news channels). In 
keeping with the groundwork established by the Italian cultural critic 
Pier Paolo Pasolini, the attempt at a critical analysis, however 
controcorrente (counter-current), is to delineate a process by which the 
very notion of ‘reform’ can be shown to have assumed a plus-valence of 
meanings. To navigate such a process, then, is to characteristically 
engage in semantic choices that must be continuously spelled out, 
contextualized, if one is to arrive at any sustainable assessment of the 
present conditions of the EU project. Following this, the necessity of 
distinguishing at least between two invariably contradictory tenants 
becomes apparent in the formulation of a) the media reformist ideology 
and b) the reformist ideology tout court. The two, though they derive 
their discursive framing from the same basic conceptual background, 
can be said to be part of a false ‘family-relation’ if we were to invoke 
Wittgenstein’s work on such relationships of meaning. In fact, because of 
the techno-cultural developments present (especially since the later part 
of the twentieth century), the divergence that takes place posits 
interesting developments as far as cognitive frameworks are concerned. 
Basically, the media reformist ideology (technologically grounded), uses 
as a legitimizing agent the reformist ideology tout court. It does so in 
order to frame, in a regressive form, particular social events in terms of 
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the dominating cultural/political apparatus while presenting the façade 
of a ‘reformist’ vision. In other words, a progressive, pro-active 
discourse is presented as a vehicle for a substantially regressive (but, not 
conservative) narrative. 
A controversy of cartoons 
The period starting with the publication on the 30th of September 2005 
by the Jyllands-Posten, a well-known Danish newspaper, of twelve 
cartoons under the rubric ‘The Faces of Mohamed’ sets the stage for our 
critical analysis by a brief historical background. What briefly follows 
are some of the highlights of the process. 
On the 12th of October 2005, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper 
receives death-threats while about a thousand Muslims protest in 
Copenhagen. On the 20th of October 2005, eleven ambassadors from 
Muslim countries, while in Copenhagen, protest in front of the office of 
Liberal Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who refuses to see 
them. On the 5th of January 2006, an agreement is reached between 
Denmark and the General Secretary of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, 
for the distribution in Arab countries of a letter from Rasmussen who, 
while defending freedom of expression, condemns any action that 
demonizes groups because of creed and ethnic belonging. On the 10th of 
January 2006, the Norwegian newspaper Magazinet again publishes the 
twelve cartoons. Two days later, the editor-in-chief claims to have 
received death-threats. 
The controversy that grew out of this state of affairs, as other 
newspapers both in Europe and North America published some or all of 
the cartoons, eventually led to violent repercussions across the world, 
especially in certain Muslim countries. About 139 people have died in 
such different locations as Nigeria, Libya, Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
The original intent, as expressed by Flemming Rose, the Jyllands-
Posten’s culture editor in his September 30th, 2005, article “Muhammeds 
ansigt” (“The Face of Muhammad”), was that of dealing with self-
censorship in the Western world at large when dealing with texts that 
involved representation of the Muslim faith and the understanding of 
contemporary democracy and freedom of speech:  
The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a special 
position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is 
incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you 
must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule. It is certainly not 
always attractive and nice to look at, and it does not mean that religious feelings 
should be made fun of at any price, but that is of minor importance in the 
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present context.... we are on our way to a slippery slope where no one can tell 
how the self-censorship will end. That is why Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten has 
invited members of the Danish editorial cartoonists union to draw Muhammad 
as they see him.[1]  
If we take the statement at face value (without forgetting that the text 
considered is a translation into English), the reader will not fail to notice 
certain presuppositions that mark the ideological position of the writer. 
Democracy – albeit in this special case – is reduced to “you must be 
ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule,” something that is 
constitutive of “modern, secular society,” which is “rejected by some 
Muslims” who keep “insisting on special consideration of their own 
religious feelings.” Perhaps the writer was thinking about the recent past, 
and such things as the Inquisition and the periodic witch-hunts that have 
marked for several centuries the cultural developments of the Western 
world, finally equating the two histories (the Western, the Muslim) 
without making proper religious connections (the Inquisition and the 
witch-hunts developed from the Christian religion’s view of things), as if 
to say that present democratic systems have rejected that particular 
religious credo in favor of a fully secularist society. A dubious tenant at 
best, since it is quite evident that Christianity still plays quite an 
important role, culturally, politically, in certain countries in Europe and 
North America. Or, it is also possible that the very same writer had a 
selective case of amnesia since for the Islamic faith any representations of 
their prophet are seen as blasphemous. In this case, respect of religious 
differences – which is integral to democratic participation – is 
conveniently forgotten. 
In a way then, the position taken in the article expresses a refusal of 
religious sensibilities prescribed to a particular group, while omitting, 
or hiding, the fact that the claim of a secularist position is only to be 
applied to another group which, nevertheless, develops from a different 
religious experience. Not only that, but the reduction of democratic 
practices to the level of putting up with “insults, mockery and ridicule” 
negates the continuous negotiations at a social and political level that 
marks such cultural events. It could be argued that if Christians in 
general were asked to accept at large, as part of democratic 
participation, the genderization of their God as a female being, protests 
would have erupted as well. But, of course, what is being invoked is a 
process of cultural relativity, which for some Christian figureheads is 
equally reprehensible. 
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Finally, the position assumes a polarized perspective which negates, 
ceremoniously and humorlessly, precisely the democratic process 
envisioned. On one side, some Muslims who fundamentally reject 
democracy because of their religion; on the other, the “democratic 
clowns” enjoying their freedom of speech quite seriously. Were it not for 
the numerous deaths that occurred because of the controversy, one could 
dismiss the above article as another amongst a host of examples of “non-
negotiable ideological perspectives” that mar the present fluid and 
chaotic formulations that accompany the development of the EU project. 
However, another article by the same author, this time published in the 
Washington Post, on February 19th, 2006, gives rise to other speculations 
that emanate from the first article: 
The cartoonists treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, 
Hinduism and other religions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals 
they made a point: We are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire 
because you are part of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, 
rather than excluding, Muslims.[2]  
This time, humor (satire) is used to underscore the idea of “integration” 
within the greater Danish society of the special category: Muslims. Gone 
is the qualifier “some” from the previous article; now it is the whole of 
Muslim society which must accept that its religion can be made fun of, as 
a sign of integration into the larger Danish society (which by this point in 
time has assumed the connotation of the whole of the Western world, 
given the context of the second article: The Washington Post).  
Of course, questions arise as to who/what is to be “integrated,” the 
very process of integration (does it stand for “assimilation”?), and the 
use of satire as a litmus test for democratic participation. But, most 
important is the omission of the greater context that surrounds the 
process delineated above – since the controversy has not been magically 
erased from having occurred. At no time has the on-going war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq ever been presented as a cultural constituent of the 
‘religious sensibilities’ displayed by what were initially ‘some’ 
Muslims in Denmark. This grave and tragic omission is for us the proper 
cultural test of pseudo-democratic statements (reformist, progressive, 
occurring within the mediascape – from newspapers to TV news to 
internet blogs, etc) that are in reality regressive propositions of the state 
of things. As such it is not conservative, since such a position would 
invariably define itself accordingly in the democratic negotiation 
process. The media reformist ideology bypasses by its very process any 
type of negotiation, since it espouses a progressive view while operating 
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as a regressive social construct. By doing so, it renders obsolete and 
undermines – at a practical level – the very political categories that are 
still embedded in Western societies as constitutive of democratic 
participation and responsibilities, that is the very notion of progress. 
Another humorless world is possible 
Is the process delineated above, the media reformist ideology construct, 
inescapable as we become more and more technologically 
interconnected? 
Primarily, we believe that such a process is part of an epochal shift 
which is still taking place with the Western world as a point of 
departure. The shift is from a society that derives and responds to its 
information from the written word to one elaborated along the lines of 
techno-progress: information as sets of moving images. Given these 
premises, the information process has been moving from the reflective 
(the written word) to the emotive (the moving image). This movement 
from the reflective to the emotive is best illustrated by the media 
reformist ideology since it is here where the “image-laden information 
process” triumphs, overriding any attempt at critical reflective 
processes. As we have implied in our brief illustration above, any critical 
attempt is vanquished by the sheer force of the image-impact that frames 
discursive practices. The various television reports that have shown the 
reaction in particular Muslim countries to the cartoon controversy have 
been able to polarize the average viewer in the now typical world of 
“culture wars” so aptly blueprinted by Samuel Huntington back in the 
mid-nineties. The very same script has legitimized, under the surface of 
things, the state of “continuous war” as invoked primarily by various 
regressive groups (religious and secularist) in the US, and which has 
found in Iraq a modus operandi. 
Invariably, any critical assessment is by its very nature a political 
perspective, notwithstanding the fact that the epochal shift in progress 
requires the de-politicization of the lifeworld, and with it, all political 
categories as we move towards a neutral but paradoxical framework of 
social references aptly encasing the individual subject within an emotive 
pseudo-participatory world. So, as we attempt to maintain the critical 
tools derived from the political sphere tout court, the encounter(s) 
between the mediated social groups that are still constitutive of the 
social arena in the Western world still see the practical engagement that 
derives from the practice of social criticism. To illustrate this, we must 
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return to specific critical positions which nevertheless circulated, 
however limitedly, within the process illustrated above. 
Annamaria Rivera, in her article “Vignette o stereotipi? Le radici di 
un caso” (“Cartoons or Stereotypes? The Roots of a Controversy”), which 
appeared in the Italian left-leaning newspaper Liberazione on the 18th of 
March, 2006, presents an uncontextualized critical assessment of what 
had occurred. First of all, the ideological positioning of the Danish 
newspaper (which was never part of the discursive Western media 
framework) was reported as being the spokespiece for an anti-
immigration and anti-Muslim political party (socio-political context) in 
Denmark. But her criticism does not fulfill the partial lens of political 
opposites; in fact in her analysis she presents the larger context: 
Isolare la vicenda dalla temperie del dopo 11 settembre per iscriverla nella 
categoria, concepita come astratta e immutabile, della libertà d’espressione è 
un’operazione alquanto sospetta, tanto più se i difensori del principio assoluto 
della libertà di “satira” sono gli stessi che mai hanno nominato, a proposito di 
questa vicenda, la parola razzismo.  
(To isolate what has happened from the political climate of the 11th of 
September in order to enter it into the category, conceived as abstract and 
unchanging, of freedom of expression is a suspect operation, especially so if the 
defenders of the absolute principle of the freedom of ‘satire’ are the same who 
have never mentioned throughout this the word racism.) 
The analysis is to the point: Muslims have been represented through the 
racist stereotype only as potential terrorists and the Islamic religion as 
pure violence – notwithstanding the present conditions Muslims live 
under in such places as Afghanistan and Iraq. As well, the anti-Muslim 
discourse resembles another discourse, a sadly infamous one: the anti-
Semitic discourse. As we wrote in an article which appeared in March, 
2006 for Trentagiorni with reference to her article: 
Nella sua analisi, la giornalista è riuscita ad indicare criticamente non solo come 
sia indispensabile una lettura attenta del testo e del contesto, ma anche la 
necessità di evidenziare nettamente i problemi ed i risultati, quella responsabilità 
- come scordarsi dei morti causati dalle vignette? - negata dalla voluta ignoranza 
del rapporto già indicato. 
(In her analysis the journalist has been able to critically show not only the 
necessity of a reading which incorporates text and context, but also the need to 
neatly foreground the problems and the results, the responsibility – how can one 
forget the deaths that have come about because of the cartoons – denied by the 
intentional ignorance of the relationship shown above). 
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In this context, then Italian Minister for Institutional Reforms Roberto 
Calderoli’s decision on the 15th of February 2006 to wear a t-shirt 
depicting one of the infamous cartoons and to publicly display it on 
Italian national television was an act of provocation with a precise 
result: eleven people dead in Libya, when about 1,000 people violently 
protested against the Italian consulate in Bengasi and the police had to 
intervene. Rather than being a question of freedom of speech, as the 
repeated display of such cartoons would indicate, the whole process can 
be seen as part of an intentional strategy to further polarize the Western 
world into two opposite cultural and religious camps, with the religious 
space absorbing the cultural frames. Canada also had a say in this: from 
the philosophy professor in Halifax who displayed the cartoons on his 
office door to the right-wing Western Standard’s decision to republish the 
cartoons on February 13, 2006. Interestingly enough, Conservative 
Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor intervened by criticizing the 
decision to republish the cartoons since he thought this could endanger 
the lives of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan. Yet, no connection was 
made in the various media reports that analyzed the arrest of the 
Toronto-17 (an abbreviation for the seventeen men and youngsters of 
Islamic creed arrested on several terrorist charges in June 2006). 
What is important at this stage is to delineate the process of 
polarization, and the strategy behind the cartoons controversy. The 
media reformist ideology suggests a practical reading if we are to 
consider the controversy as a cultural trap with political consequences. 
After the EU failed to pass the referenda test, the general opinion was 
that the vision that sustained the complexification of Europe had come to 
a state of complete disarray. Apart from a lack of vision, the attempt to 
unify different sovereign countries according to some basic economic 
constituent or contract showed its limits and illusions given the 
globalizing drive that contain the whole process. A layman’s 
interpretation, however limited in scope, would contend that had the EU 
passed the referenda test, it would have been to the detriment not only of 
the various progressive and reactionary groups acting against them but 
also, and most importantly, it would have been to the detriment of the 
only superpower left on the world stage. Invariably, a strong EU posits 
an economic and cultural challenge to the aspirations of world 
leadership by the US. It is not a matter of “business is business,” but as 
the American dream spells it: the illusions of a way of life, which 
becomes questionable once alternatives are produced. In these simple 
terms, and without abandoning a critical position, the cartoon 
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controversy offers a different perspective. If, as we have already stated, 
the media reformist ideology operates by the aura of legitimacy that 
comes from the governing adjective, then the whole controversy was a 
tactical ploy to embed the European formulations within a semantic 
structure that could not fail to alienate the Other (in this case, the Muslim 
world at large). In so doing, the Other’s understanding of Europe ends 
up shoring up a different vision, one consistent with the notorious 
American practice of ratfucking[3]. In this case, given the various 
responses both from the right and the left of the European political 
spectrum as expressed by the various newspapers and magazines that 
reproduced the cartoons in the name of freedom of expression, the most 
striking achievement was to: a) de-contextualize Europe as an 
independent cultural and political force, and b) to re-align the Western 
world according to American premises of governance. 
One of the most distinctive voices in the European cultural market is 
the magazine The Economist, characterized by Marx back in the 
nineteenth century as the blueprint of bourgeoisie capitalist aspirations. 
The influence of this magazine transcends nationalistic boundaries 
proper and, as such, its aspiration of serving as a guiding light for the 
construction of the European project is more than legitimate. Within the 
various positions that transpire from editorials and signed pieces, one 
analysis in particular has been in the forefront of the debate: “Culture 
Wars”, which appeared on the 4th of February, 2006. In it, writer 
Charlemagne refers back to the Salzburg meeting in January 2006 that 
opened up the discussion to a common European identity: 
But European leaders now want to go beyond idealism to assert particular 
qualities of Europeanness and make specific arguments about the EU. At a 
recent gathering of the panjandrums of politics and the arts in Salbburg, they 
did so by making three claims: that there is a distinctive European identity, 
enshrined in a common European culture; that European culture inspires 
people in ways that boring things such as markets and trade to not; and that a 
common European culture should be embodied in common European 
institutions, that is the EU.[4]  
Interestingly, the writer posits the following dilemmas with regards to a 
common European way of life: a) there is no single European culture, b) 
any definition that embraces such values as “respect for human rights, 
the rule of the law, care for the poor and a love of liberty is not 
distinctively European,” c) “Europeans’ cultural references are at least 
as populist and American... as they are high-minded and European,” d) 
the last to try to give Europe a soul, amongst various empires, “were the 
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communists of eastern Europe” and, finally e) the problem posited by 
Turkey’s application and that “European distinctiveness can be a way of 
attacking globalization.” 
The multicultural space 
The five-pronged, or star-shaped hostility – ironically, in respect to the 
EU’s flag symbols – against the notion of a European common identity 
can be summarized by the last part of Charlemagne’s diatribe: 
“European distinctiveness can be a way of attacking globalization.” In 
other words, any attempt by EU bigwigs to formulate a common 
cultural platform, one that would be a uniting factor above and beyond 
the various economic interests, is doomed to failure in the first instance 
by the present world-system economic construct. Globalization has been 
attacked, again from the opposite ends of the political spectrum, for 
being an economic plan to sustain the US’s worldview. What 
Charlemagne fails to acknowledge in his presentation is not only the 
various contradictions that arises from his position, such as, for 
example, the invocation that “For too many, it is America that is creative 
and exciting, not Europe” with reference to building an European media-
culture network, but the unacknowledged fact that constitutes today’s 
European reality. Multicultural societies are under attack around the 
world for several reasons which can always be reduced to the simplistic 
polarization of a war of cultures. Thanks to the polarization process 
aided by media reformist ideology, dominant jingoistic cultural and 
political positions can recuperate those cultural spaces of negotiation 
that are created by democratic processes as they become more complex. 
It is a phenomenon that can be seen to begin, however ironically, with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. As the supra-system of the world’s political 
structure began to crumble – the cold détente between the two 
superpowers – the experimental democratic spaces of active 
participation that were created, such as lived-multiculturalism, could 
not continue to function as such. Laboratories of experienced subjective 
multiplicity were to be brought back under the guidance of a common 
ideological position. The conflict created ad hoc, thanks to the 
formulations of disciplined, organic, intellectuals, between geo-cultural 
spaces within or without specific nation-states, translates into a process 
of cultural redundancy for the elite social classes. Given that, as 
Fukuyama testified, history has been vanquished and conquered; the 
‘new history’ could not be but the instantaneous news of the mediatic 
circle: the consumption of ‘star’ lives and their lifestyles enclosed within 
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the parenthesis of ‘reality’ programs. An alternate to this summarization 
is to be found in a very different historical trajectory: the discontinuous 
process that stems from the Signorie (if we are to talk about, en passant, 
European frameworks) to ECN (European Counter Network). It would 
require re-reading Machiavelli through Hardt and Negri’s lenses for 
one, as well as indicating in certain aspects of the French revolution a 
position that distinctly posited a vision of Europe un-bound by 
technology. This particularized reading would encompass Rimbaud’s 
presence in 1871 in the Paris Commune, and negotiate formative cultural 
spaces within the various avant-gardes and twentieth-century 
movements (Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Lettrism), to finally erupt 
with May ’68 and the end of Movimento ’77, only to be resurrected by 
the electronic agora-heimat of the European-based subcultures present in 
the World Wide Web. 
Still, the EU as a complexification process fails distinctively to 
redress the multiculturalist project that has been the source of its 
historical development, even within the European’s cultural canon if we 
expose those cultural agents who saw it as a fundamental principle. Any 
criticism of the EU project that diverts its scope from addressing this 
particular issue partakes of the mystifying quality of the media reformist 
ideology, and in this fashion, collapses the economic trust into the 
labyrinth of a pseudo-common identity discussion favoring the world-
view of a single, universal entity. 
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